在計(jì)算機(jī)和半導(dǎo)體制造領(lǐng)域，美國(guó)事實(shí)上早就在執(zhí)行由政府引導(dǎo)的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。上世紀(jì)80年代，美國(guó)政府對(duì)美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體制造技術(shù)戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟撥款10億美元，以創(chuàng)造具有“超前競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性”的技術(shù)，保持美國(guó)技術(shù)領(lǐng)先地位，避免過(guò)度依賴(lài)外國(guó)供應(yīng)商。蘋(píng)果公司研發(fā)的幾乎所有產(chǎn)品，包括鼠標(biāo)、顯示器、操作系統(tǒng)、觸摸屏等，都得到了美國(guó)政府部門(mén)的支持，甚至有些直接萌芽于政府實(shí)驗(yàn)室。

　　在軍工領(lǐng)域，美國(guó)對(duì)軍工企業(yè)提供了包括稅收優(yōu)惠、貸款擔(dān)保、采購(gòu)承諾等不同形式的支持，對(duì)瀕臨破產(chǎn)的大型軍工企業(yè)提供臨時(shí)性政府貸款、企業(yè)重組基金、破產(chǎn)保護(hù)、過(guò)渡基金和債務(wù)減免等優(yōu)惠政策?！?014年美國(guó)國(guó)防生產(chǎn)法案》規(guī)定，“總統(tǒng)可授權(quán)擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)向私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)提供貸款擔(dān)保，以資助該擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)定的，對(duì)建立、維護(hù)、擴(kuò)大、保護(hù)或恢復(fù)國(guó)防所需生產(chǎn)或服務(wù)至關(guān)重要的任何軍工承包商、分包商、關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施或其他國(guó)防生產(chǎn)供應(yīng)商等”。2016年，全球最大的軍工企業(yè)洛克希德·馬丁公司獲得康涅狄格州2億美元資金支持。

In the field of computer and semiconductor manufacturing, the US has long adopted government-led industrial policies. The US government allocated US$1 billion in the 1980s to SEMATECH to support cutting-edge research, with a view to maintaining America’s leading position in this area and preventing over-reliance on foreign suppliers. Apple’s research and development on nearly all of its products, including the mouse, the display, the operating system, and the touch screen, received support from US government departments, with some of them created directly in labs run by the government. In the military-defense industry, the US has supported related enterprises with preferential taxes, loan guarantees, procurement commitments, etc. Large military-defense enterprises on the brink of bankruptcy have been offered special government loans, restructuring funds, bankruptcy protection, transitional funds, debt relief and other preferential policies. As provided in the 2014 Defense Production Act, “The President may authorize a guaranteeing agency to provide guarantees of loans by private institutions for the purpose of financing any contractor, subcontractor, provider of critical infrastructure, or other person in support of production capabilities or supplies that are deemed by the guaranteeing agency to be necessary to create, maintain, expedite, expand, protect, or restore production and deliveries or services essential to the national defense”. In 2016, Lockheed Martin, the world’s largest military-defense company, obtained US$200 million from the State of Connecticut. 

　　在農(nóng)業(yè)領(lǐng)域，美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)實(shí)施高額財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼政策，世界上絕大多數(shù)農(nóng)業(yè)補(bǔ)貼政策均起源于美國(guó)。根據(jù)烏拉圭回合談判的結(jié)果，美國(guó)可在191億美元的補(bǔ)貼上限內(nèi)對(duì)各單項(xiàng)產(chǎn)品提供“黃箱”補(bǔ)貼。憑借雄厚的財(cái)力和充裕的補(bǔ)貼空間，美國(guó)對(duì)其大量出口的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品提供了高額補(bǔ)貼。這些補(bǔ)貼影響了世界農(nóng)產(chǎn)品的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，多次遭到相關(guān)國(guó)家挑戰(zhàn)，巴西與美國(guó)之間歷時(shí)12年之久的陸地棉補(bǔ)貼案就是典型代表。2014年，美國(guó)對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)補(bǔ)貼政策作出重大調(diào)整，以“價(jià)格損失保障計(jì)劃”和“農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保障計(jì)劃”替代原有的“反周期支付”等直接補(bǔ)貼計(jì)劃，但仍與價(jià)格掛鉤，“黃箱”補(bǔ)貼的性質(zhì)并未變化，而支持水平卻持續(xù)增加。美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部前首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約瑟夫·格勞勃等指出，這兩種保障計(jì)劃設(shè)定的參考價(jià)格均高于過(guò)去的目標(biāo)價(jià)格，實(shí)際是提高了補(bǔ)貼支持水平。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)研究局的測(cè)算表明，兩項(xiàng)保障計(jì)劃2015年和2016年支出分別為101億美元和109億美元，而且2016-2017年度支持水平超出了2014年新法案出臺(tái)前的水平。其中，對(duì)各單項(xiàng)產(chǎn)品支持的總金額接近150億美元，為近10年的最高水平。此外，美國(guó)還通過(guò)各類(lèi)信用擔(dān)保計(jì)劃促進(jìn)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口，并通過(guò)各類(lèi)非緊急糧食援助計(jì)劃將大量過(guò)剩農(nóng)產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)移到國(guó)外，導(dǎo)致了嚴(yán)重的商業(yè)替代，對(duì)受援國(guó)當(dāng)?shù)剞r(nóng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)造成嚴(yán)重干擾，侵害了其他農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口國(guó)的利益。

In agriculture, high subsidies have long been a policy of the US, the birthplace of the majority of agriculture subsidies in the world. As a result of the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations, the US can give all individual items up to US$ 19.1 billion in amber box subsidies. With abundant financial resources and extensive room for subsidies, the US provides high subsidies for its huge agricultural exports. These subsidies undermine fair international competition and have been repeatedly challenged by other countries, a case in point being the 12-year-long dispute with Brazil over the upland cotton subsidy. In 2014, as part of a major adjustment to its agriculture subsidy policy, the US replaced direct subsidy programs, such as the Counter-cyclical Payment, with the Price Loss Coverage Program and the Agricultural Risk Coverage Program. Simply another form of amber box subsidy, these price-pegged subsidies resulted in a higher level of support. Joseph Glauber, the former chief economist of the US Department of Agriculture, pointed out that these two coverage programs, with reference prices set higher than the target prices of the past, in fact raised the level of subsidy support.  According to the Congressional Research Service, the two programs together cost US$10.1 billion in 2015 and US$10.9 billion in 2016. The 2016-2017 support level was higher than before the introduction of the act in 2014.  A total of nearly US$15 billion was spent in support of individual items, the highest in nearly a decade.  The US also boosted its agricultural exports through various forms of credit guarantee programs. On top of that, the US sent a large volume of the excess farm produce abroad as non-emergency food aid, which led to serious problems of commercial substitution, distorting local agricultural markets in the recipient countries, and undermining the interests of other agricultural exporting countries.